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Envy, the inclination to compare rewards, can be
expected to unfold when inequalities in terms
of payoff differences are generated in competitive
societies. It is shown that increasing levels of envy
lead inevitably to a self-induced separation into a
lower and an upper class. Class stratification is Nash
stable and strict, with members of the same class
receiving identical rewards. Upper class agents play
exclusively pure strategies, all lower class agents the
same mixed strategy. The fraction of upper class
agents decreases progressively with larger levels of
envy, until a single upper class agent is left. Numerical
simulations and a complete analytic treatment of a
basic reference model, the shopping trouble model,
are presented. The properties of the class-stratified
society are universal and only indirectly controllable
through the underlying utility function, which
implies that class stratified societies are intrinsically
resistant to political control. Implications for human
societies are discussed. It is pointed out that the
repercussions of envy are amplified when societies
become increasingly competitive.
1. Background
Is it possible that societies separate on their own into
distinct social classes when everybody is otherwise
interchangeable, born equal? This is the question
examined here. Being equal means in a game theoretical
setting that agents have access to the same options and
payoff functions. Starting with random initial policies,
strategies evolve according to the payoff received on
the average. For our investigation we assume that three
constituent features characterize the payoff function.
Firstly, options come with a range of distinct payoffs.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the
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Secondly, competition for resources is present, which implies that agents selecting the same option
are penalized. Thirdly, players care how they are doing with respect to others. We show that an
endogenous transition to a strictly class stratified society takes place when these three conditions
are fulfilled.
It is well established that people live not in isolation, but that social context influences memory,
cognition and risk taking in general [1–3], that it leads to accountability [4] and to group decision
making [5]. A key aspect of social context is the quest for social status [6,7], which has been
modeled using several types of status games [8,9]. Of particular relevance to our approach is the
notion that the satisfaction an individual receives from having and spending money depends not
only on the absolute level of consumption, but also on how this level compares with that of others
[10]. This view has seen widespread support from relative income theory [11,12]. Relative gauges
are considered similarly to be of relevance for the definition of poverty [13,14].
The outcome of a game may be considered fair in a social context when nobody has an
incentive to trade the reward received. For the problem of allocating multiple types of goods,
which may be either divisible or indivisible, like apples, banana and kiwis, the outcome is said
to be free of envy when the recipients are content with their bundles [15,16]. Here we use envy
in analogy to denote the propensity to compare rewards between agents. When relative success
is important it implies that the payoff function is functionally dependent on the outcome, the
average payoff received. A feedback loop is such established. It is well known, e.g. from the
theory of phase transitions in physics [17], that feedback loops can lead to collective phenomena
and hence to novel states. Indeed we find that envy induces a new state, a self-induced class
stratified Nash equilibrium.
We examine here the interaction between social context and competition for scarce resources,
which lies at the core of many games. A typical example is the Hawks and Doves framework,
for which the reward is divided when both agents select the same behavioral option. In a society
of agents a range of options yielding distinct payoffs will be in general available. In this setting,
competition may force agents to select different strategies, for instance to settle for the second best
course of action when the option with the highest prospective reward has already been claimed
by somebody else. The outcome is a multi-agent Nash state, forced cooperation, in which agents
seemingly cooperate by avoiding each other, but only because it pays off and not out of sheer good
will. Other forms of cooperation [18], such as reciprocal altruism [19] and indirect reciprocity
[20], share this trait. A key aspect of forced cooperation is that it is unfair in terms of reward
differentials, the precondition for envy to take effect.
Forced cooperation can be argued to a generic feature of real-world societies, both when agents
are differentiated or not. In ecology, for instance, non-uniform resource allocation is observed in
competitive population dynamics models when resources are scarce [21]. Envy has hence the
potential to induce novel societal states in which just the initial conditions, and not differences
between agents per se, determine in which class someone ends up. In previous studies, class
structures have been presumed to exist [22], or to be dependent on as-of-birth differences [8].
Clustering into distinct classes may occur similarly for networks of agents when comparison is
restricted to neighbors [23].
Outcome and input, the reward received and the structure of the payoff function, are
interdependent when envy is present, a setup that is typical for dynamical systems studied
by complex systems theory [24]. Key aspects of the present investigation, including in part
terminology and analysis methods, are hence based on complex systems theory. One could also
ask if it would be feasible to optimize properties of the stationary state considered desirable, such
as fairness, as done within mechanism design theory [25]. An example would be to set incentives
for prosocial behavior [26], with the overall aim to optimize society [27]. This is a highly relevant
program. But what if the stationary state of the society has in part universal properties that cannot
be altered by changing the underlying utility function, being independent of it? We find, that this
is precisely what happens when envy is relevant.
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Figure 1. Forced cooperation. The shopping trouble model in the absence of envy, ε=0. For κ=0.3,M=100 agents
and N=100 options, the payoffs Eα(qi) (connected by lines) obtained using evolutionary dynamics are shown. The
underlying utility function, v(qi) = 1− (1− qi)2, has been included as a reference (black squares). Only pure strategies
are played, which implies that the rewardsRα correspond to the peaks of the respective payoffs, compare (2.1). A total of
65 options are selected, 30 by a single agent (red) and 35 by two agents (blue). Competition forces the agents to accept
inequalities in terms of a wide range of different rewards. Top: Two example strategies. For most qualities qi the payoffs
Eα(qi) (red/blue symbols) fall on top of each other. Bot: All M strategies. In order to avoid overcrowding symbols are
not shown.
Our basic model is motivated by a shopping analogy. A clique of friends gathers for an
exclusive wine tasting, with everyone shopping beforehand. There are several wine outlets, each
specialized in a specific quality. In the wine cellars a wide selection of vintage years are kept in
storage, but only a single bottle per year. Shopping in the same wine cellar as somebody else
implies then that someone has to content with second-best vintage year. At the gathering, the
friends enjoy the wine, becoming envious if somebody else made the better deal. Both extensive
numerical simulation of the shopping trouble model and an encompassing analytic treatment of
the class stratified state are presented. An overview of the terminology used is given in Sect. 4.5.
2. Model
The shopping trouble model is defined directly in terms of strategies, which are given by the
probabilities pα(qi) that agent α selects option i. The quality qi corresponds to the numerical
value associated with option i. For convenience we consider equidistant qualities qi ∈ [0, 2]. The
support of a strategy is given by the set of options for which pα(qi)> 0. A strategy is pure when
the support contains a single option, and mixed otherwise. In the modelM agents haveN options
to select from, where N may be either smaller or larger than M .
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The payoff an agent receives when selecting qi isEαi . On the average, agents receive the reward
Rα,
Rα =
∑
i
pα(qi)E
α
i , R¯=
1
M
∑
α
Rα , (2.1)
where we have defined also the mean reward R¯ of all agents. For the shopping trouble model the
payoff Eαi contains three terms:
Eαi = v(qi)− κ
∑
β 6=α
pβ(qi) + ε p
α(qi) log
(
Rα
R¯
)
. (2.2)
The first term, v(qi) = 1− (1− qi)2, is the underlying utility function, compare Fig. 1. Its
functional form, as an inverted parabola, is motivated by the shopping analogy. In this case,
products having a bare utility u(qi) can be acquired at a price qi in the ith shop. The bare utility
should be concave, in view of the law of diminishing utility [28], say u(qi) = a log(qi + 1). The
utility entering (2.2), v(qi) = u(qi)− qi, is in this case well approximated by an inverted parabola.
The second term in (2.2) encodes competition. A penalty κ(m− 1) is to be paid by allm agents
when these m agents decide for the same option. It is troublesome, in the shopping analogy, to
buy something in a crowded shop. Encoding competition directly in terms of the strategy, as done
in (2.2), is an adaptation of the framework used commonly for animal conflict models [29], such
as the war of attrition and all pay auctions.
The third term in (2.2) encodes the desire to compare one’s own success, the reward Rα,
with that what others receive. As a yardstick, the average reward R¯ has been taken, with the
envy ε encoding the intensity of the comparison. The log-dependency, log(Rα/R¯), is consistent
with the Weber-Fechner law, namely that the brain discounts sensory stimuli, numbers and time
logarithmically [30–32]. Equivalent logarithmic dependencies have been found for the production
of data [33], and decision-induced chart rankings [34]. For small relative deviations from the
mean, when δRα = (Rα − R¯)/R¯ 1, the envy term becomes linear, log(Rα/R¯)∼ δRα. Envy is
then directly proportional to Rα − R¯, a functionality that is equivalently at the basis of status
seeking games [35]. In effect, the rational behind the envy term is straightforward. When happy,
when log(Rα/R¯)> 0, the agent reinforces the current strategy, which is encoded by pα(qi), trying
to change it instead when log(Rα/R¯)< 0.
The utility function (2.2) of the shopping trouble model can be considered to encode status
seeking, albeit indirectly. Agents try to maximize utility not only in absolute, but also in relative
terms, with the envy parameter ε determining the relative weight of the two contributions.
Outperforming others corresponds in this interpretation to increased levels of social status. In
difference to standard status seeking games [36], for which agents follow two separate objectives,
utility and status maximization, the shopping trouble model contains only a single, combined
utility. The issue of Pareto optimality does hence not arise.
The bare formulation of the here introduced shopping trouble game, as given by (2.2), is
supplemented by the concept of migration. One postulates that agents receiving negative rewards
leave the society in search for better opportunities. Better no reward at all than to engage with
detrimental returns. Negative rewards appear for large κ and elevated densities ν =M/N of
agents per options, e.g. necessarily when M = 2N and κ> 1. For M <N there are in contrast
always Nash equilibria for which all individual rewards are positive. Migration is induced
additionally by the envy term, as log(Rα/R¯) diverges negatively for Rα→ 0. Numerically we
solved the shopping trouble model using standard replicator dynamics [37],
pαi (t+ 1) =
pαi (t)E
α
i (t)∑
j p
α
j (t)E
α
j (t)
. (2.3)
For a smooth convergence one adds a constant offset E0 to the payoffs on the right-hand side.
The offset helps in particular to avoid the occurrence of negative rewards, which can arise
intermediately when a time evolution scheme is discrete in time, as for (2.3). Typically we took
E0 = 20, iterating 5 · 105 times. A defining feature of the shopping trouble model is that all agents
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Figure 2. Spontaneous policy reorganization. For κ=0.3, M=20 agents and N=20 options, the payoffs
Eα(qi), as connected by lines (top panels), and the respective strategies pα(qi) (bottom panels). For ε=0.5 (left
panels) and ε= 0.7 (right panels). For the simulations (2.3) has been used. Symbols have been added for clarity to the
four individual mixed strategies in the lower-left panel. For ε=0.7 seven agents play pure strategies (red), the other 13
agents the identical mixed strategy (brown). Included in the upper-right panel are the theory predictions for the lower/upper
class rewards RL and RU (dashed lines), as given by (3.1) and (3.2). Compare Fig. 1 for ε=0.
have functionally identical payoffs. Only the starting strategies, which we did draw from a flat
distribution, differentiate between agents.
3. Results
In the absence of envy, when ε= 0, agents just need to compare the payoff v(qi)− κ of options
already taken by somebody else to the one’s that are still available. For κ= 0.3 the outcome is
presented in Fig. 1. Qualities with larger utilities are doubly taken, lower returning options on
the other hand only by a single agent. The resulting Nash state is unique. Agents avoid each
other, as far as possible, which could be interpreted as cooperation. Cooperation is however not
voluntary, but forced by the penalty∼κ incurring when not cooperating. A consequence of forced
cooperation is that the payoffs received by individual agents vary considerably. This is notable,
as all players start out equal, differing only with respect to their initial strategies.
The forced cooperating state is modified once ε becomes finite, retaining however its overall
character for moderate envy. Altogether two types of multi-agent Nash equilibria are observed.
• Forced Cooperation. The distribution of rewards is continuous. Pure strategies dominate.
With increasing envy mixed strategies become more frequent. Stable for small to
intermediate ε.
• Class Separation. The society separates strictly into an upper and a lower class. Upper
class agents play exclusively pure strategies, all lower class agents the identical mixed
strategy. Agents belonging to the same class receive identical rewards. The number
6rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
R
.S
oc.
open
sci.
0000000
..............................................................
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
qualities/options  qi
0
0.5
1
1.5
pa
yo
ffs
  E
α
(q i
) utility  v(qi)
ε = 0.4
pure, two agents per option
pure, one agent
per option
mixed strategies
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
qualities/options  qi
0
0.5
1
1.5
pa
yo
ffs
  E
α
(q i
) utility  v(qi)
ε = 0.8
pure, 20 agents
RU  theory
RL
mixed, 80 agents
Figure 3. Self-induced class separation. For M=N=100 and κ=0.3, the payoffs Eα(qi) for the two types of
Nash equilibria found, forced cooperation, and class separation (top/bottom). Top: For ε= 0.4. The number of agents
playing mixed (green) and pure (red/blue) strategies are 10 and 90. A total of 62 pure qualities are selected, 34/28 by
one/two agents. Bottom: For ε= 0.8. Pure strategies (red) are played by the 20 upper class agents, with all 80 lower
class agents using the identical mixed strategy (brown). Also shown are the universal theory predictions (3.1) and (3.2)
for the lower/upper class rewards RL and RU (dashed lines). The reorganization of the payoff spectrum is a collective
effect.
of upper class agents decreases monotonically with increasing envy, towards one, the
monarchy state. Stable for larger ε.
For an initial illustration we concentrate on a small system, with M =N = 20, as presented in
Fig. 2. One observes that forced cooperation dominates for ε= 0.5, but with some pronounced
differences to the case ε= 0, see Fig. 1. The support of pure and mixed strategies, which develop
for finite envy, overlap at times, which induces varies levels of competition. The supports of
different mixed strategies are distinct.
3.1 Endogenous class stratification
A complete self-organized reorganization of the spectrum of policies is observed with raising
strength of envy. The society of agents separates on its own into two distinct classes, an upper and
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a lower class. The payoff functions of all agents are identical, which implies that this transition,
as seen in Fig. 2 when going from ε= 0.5 to ε= 0.7, is a collective effect. The initial state of the
system determines uniquely where a given agent ends up. The class-stratified state has several
conspicuous properties.
• Upper class agents follow exclusively pure strategies, avoiding competition in most cases.
• A single mixed strategy develops, played by the entirety of lower class agents. The
support of the lower class mixed strategy covers all upper class pure strategies.
• Only two levels of rewards are present, one for each class.
That the payoff function Eα(qi) of the lower class is constant on the support of the lower class
mixed strategy is a necessary condition for an evolutionary stable strategy [38]. It would be
favorable to readjust the pα(qi) if this was not the case. It is also not surprising that all lower class
agents receive the same reward RL, given that they play identical strategies. Highly non-trivial is
however, that the rewards of all upper class agents coincide. This can be proven analytically, as
done in the Methods section. For RL the expression
RL = ε
1− fL
eκ/ε − 1 log
(
eκ/ε − fL
1− fL
)
(3.1)
is exact when upper class policies are unique, viz if no option is taken by more than one agent,
which hold for most instances. The only free parameter in (3.1) is the fraction of lower class agents,
fL, which needs to be determined numerically. For the Nash state shown in Fig. 2 one finds fL =
13/20 for ε= 0.7. The resulting prediction (3.1) for the reward RL of the lower agrees remarkably
well with numerics, as seen in Fig. 2. The analytic prediction for the reward of the upper class,
RU, is
RU = ε
1− fLe−κ/ε
1− e−κ/ε log
(
eκ/ε − fL
1− fL
)
, (3.2)
as derived in the Methods section. Again, theory and numerical simulations are in agreement.
The underlying utility v(qi) enters the theory expressions for RL and RU only implicitly, via
the fraction fL of lower class agents, but not explicitly. The properties of class-stratified states with
the same κ, ε, and fL are hence identical and independent of the shape of the utility function. We
tested this proposition performing simulations using a triangular utility function, v(qi) = 1− |1−
qi|, finding that (3.1) and (3.2) hold perfectly. Class-stratification leads as a consequence to a Nash
state with universal properties, the telltale sign of a collective effect.
That upper class agents receive identical payoffs is an interesting aspect of universality. It is
possible because the lower class agents adapt their strategies such that the functional dependence
of v(qi) on the qualities is exactly compensated by the competition term ∼κ. Evidence for this
mechanism can be seen in Fig. 2 for κ= 0.7.
The transition from forced cooperation to a stratified society is found for all system sizes. In
Fig. 3 we present to this end simulations for M =N = 100. Below the transition, here for κ= 0.4,
one observes that individual mixed strategies start out at the fringes of the support regions of the
pure strategies. For ε= 0.8 a stratified society is present, with the vast majority of agents, 80%,
playing one and the same mixed strategy. These agents form the lower class.
3.2 Lower class mixed strategy
When forced cooperation is present, qualities qi with high utilities v(qi) are selected without
exception by agents playing pure strategies. This is not the case for the spectrum of upper class
policies, which may have gaps in the class-stratified state, as evident both in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3.
At first sight, this could seem a contradiction to Nash stability. Lower class agents are however
more likely to visit a quality qi not selected by the upper class, as can be seen in Fig. 2, which
leads to a competition block proportional to the competition penalty κ. It is hence not favorable
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Figure 4. Mixed lower class strategy. For κ=0.3 and ε=2.0, the mixed strategy pα(qi) identical to all lower class
agents. Shown are the results of numerical simulations (black) and the respective large-N theory prediction (3.3). The dips
in the numerical result are due to the presence of two upper class agents (not shown), respectively for both M=N=20
and M=N=100. Compare Fig. 2. The improved agreement between simulations and theory between N=20 and
N=100 is consistent with the precondition of the theory, which becomes asymptotically exact in the large-N limit.
for upper class agents to switch. The occurrence of gaps implies in particular that the Nash state
is not unique.
The lower class mixed strategy has a well defined functional form, pmix(qi) = pα(qi), in the
limit fU → 0, namely
pmix(qi) =
1
κ(M − 1)
[
v(qi)− Ec
]
(3.3)
Ec = 1−
(
3κ
2
)2/3(
M − 1
N
)2/3
,
an expression derived in the Methods section. The mixed strategy given by (3.3) is clearly non-
universal, being linear in the utility v(qi), in contrast to the lower- and upper-class rewards. The
expression for the reward Ec is specific to the utility function v(qi) = 1− (1− qi)2, and hence
equally non-universal.
The simulations presented in Fig. 4 for M =N = 20 and M =N = 100 show that (3.3)
approximates the data well when the system is large. Of interest are in particular the dips in
the data for the mixed strategy, which occur for qualities qi selected by upper class agents. These
dips are essential for attaining universalRL andRU, as laid out in the Methods section. Note that
pmix(qi) is normalized,
∑
i pmix(qi) = 1, when the qualities are dense.
3.3 Monarchy vs. communism
We performed numerical simulations for a wide range of parameters, mostly forN = 100 options.
In order to check for finite-size effects we compared selected parameters settings with simulations
forN = 500, finding only minor effects. In Fig. 5 representative data for κ= 0.3 andM =N = 100
is presented. Varying the filling fraction M/N and/or κ shifts the locus of the transition, leading
otherwise only to quantitative changes. We define with Npure the number of agents playing pure
strategies and with Nmix the number of distinct mixed strategies
For small ε the fraction of mixed strategies Nmix/M raises monotonically, as shown in Fig. 5,
attaining a maximum when the transition from forced cooperation to class stratification starts to
take place, here at ε≈ 0.6. The width of the transition is finite, in the sense that either state may
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Figure 5. Characteristics of the Nash state as a function of envy. For κ=0.3 and M=N=100 the properties
of the evolutionary stable stationary state. Numerical results are averaged over at least ten random initial conditions.
Shown is the number of distinct mixed strategies per agent (brown) and the percentage of agents playing pure strategies
(blue). Denoted by ‘theory’ is the estimate for the fraction of upper class agents, as determined by the self-consistency
condition (3.4), which becomes exact for large ε. Also included are the maximal (red), the mean (yellow) and the minimal
(green) monetary incomes, compare (3.5). Forced cooperation and class separation are fully present respectively for
ε < 0.6 and ε > 0.75. In between (shaded orange), both states may be reached when starting from random initial policies.
be reached when starting from random initial conditions. As a test we ran twenty independent
simulations for κ= 0.3 and ε= 0.65, finding that about half led to forced collaboration and half to
class separation. Overall, at least ten random initial strategies have been used for the individual
data points presented in Fig. 5. The transition to class stratification is completed when the number
of mixed strategies drops to one, which is the case for κ= 0.3 for ε≈ 0.75.
The fraction of agents Npure/M playing pure strategies decreases monotonically for all ε, with
the decrease accelerating in the transition region from forced collaboration to class separation. For
large values of envy, roughly for ε > 2.2 a monarchy state is reached. The number of upper class
agents is now minimal, mostly just one, occasionally also two. An alternative to monarchy would
be communism, namely that the entire society of agents adopts pmix(qi), as defined by (3.3). We
find communism never to be stable, both when starting with random initial condition and when
starting close to the communist state. For the latter we performed simulations for which the initial
strategies of all agents was pmix(qi), plus a perturbation consisting of 1% relative noise.
Included in Fig. 5 is an approximate analytic prediction for the fraction fU = 1− fL of upper
class agents, which is obtained from solving
1−
(
3κ(M − 1)
2N
)2/3
= ε
1− fL
eκ/ε − 1 log
(
eκ/ε − fL
1− fL
)
(3.4)
self-consistently for fL. The derivation of (3.4), which is valid in the class-separated state for large
ε, N and M , is given in the Methods section. The agreement with the numerical results for the
fraction of agents playing pure strategies, which coincides with the fraction of upper class agents,
is remarkable. Of interest is in particular the observation that the theory and numerics stay close
down to the transition to forced cooperation.
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Figure 6. Social stratification transition. Phase diagram for the transition from forced cooperation (below the
lines/symbols) to the class separated state (above the lines/symbols). For the theory the locus fU=1/2, as evaluated
by solving (6) self-consistently, has been used as an indicator. The data has been obtained for N=100 and respectively
M=50/100/150. In this case the peak in the number of mixed strategies have been taken as proxies for the transition.
Compare Fig. 5. It is noticeable that theory and numerics track each other, in order of magnitude. The actual width of the
transition has not been estimated.
3.4 Reward vs. real-world income
The three terms entering the payoff function (2.2) of the shopping trouble model are distinct in
character. The underlying utility v(qi) and the penalty arsing from competition, ∼κ, are real-
world monetary payoff terms. Envy, the propensity to compare one’s own success with that of
others, could be classified in contrast as being a predominately psychological component. Taking
this view we define with
Iα =Rα − ε log
(
Rα
R¯
)∑
i
[
pα(qi)
]2 (3.5)
the monetary income Iα of agent α as the average payoff minus the envy term. In the forced
cooperation phase the average income I¯ in nearly constant as a function of envy, as shown
in Fig. 5, dropping however substantially once class stratification sets in. In this respect the
society is better off at low to moderated levels of envy. Class separation does not help the
general public. Also included in Fig. 5 are the minimal and maximal incomes, Imin = minαIα
and Imax = maxαIα. In the class stratified phase Imin and Imax correspond respectively to the
income of the lower and of the upper class. Both are flat, which implies that the drop of the
mean monetary return I¯ with increasing envy is due to the simultaneously occurring decrease in
number of upper class agents.
At no stage are incomes increased when envy is present in a competitive society. This result
holds for the maximal, the minimal and the mean income, as evident from the data presented in
Fig. 5. It is also conspicuous that the monetary returns of both the lower and the upper class are
essentially unaffected by the value of ε, once class separation sets in. This result is in agreement
with the observation that the lower class mixed strategy is well approximated by the large ε limit,
as shown in Fig. 4. Note that the reward of the upper class diverges for ε→∞, in contrast to
the monetary income. Of interest is also that I¯ remains flat during forced collaboration, despite
the fact that both Imin and Imax drop. This is due to the ongoing reorganization of the payoff
spectrum.
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3.5 Phase diagram
In Fig. 6 the phase diagram as a function of κ and ε, competition and envy, is presented. Systems
withN = 100 options andM = 50/100/150 agents have been simulated numerically. For the onset
of the transition from forced cooperation to class separation the maximum of the number of mixed
strategies has been taken as an indicator. The level of envy needed for the society to phase separate
decreases with increasing competition, a somewhat intuitive result. The same trend holds when
increasing the densityM/N of agents per available options, which makes it more difficult to avoid
each other.
Included in Fig. 6 are estimates obtained by solving the self-consistency condition (3.4) for
fU = 1/2. This rough estimate for the transition to class stratification tracts the numerical results
surprisingly well. Deviations are seen in particular for larger κ.
4. Methods
The penalty term of the shopping trouble model (2.2) can be written as∑
β 6=α
pβ(qi) =Mp¯(qi)− pα(qi), p¯(qi) = 1
M
∑
β
pβ(qi) , (4.1)
which demonstrates that agents interact via a quality-dependent mean field, the average strategy
p¯(qi). The number of terms is N − 1, which could give the impression that the shopping trouble
model is not size consistent. This is however not the case, as both pure and mixed strategies
contribute on the average to the order 1/N to the sum of the κ-term. For a fixed occupation
density ν =M/N , the thermodynamic limitM,N→∞ is therefore well defined. Numerically we
find that the properties of the Nash equilibria change only in minor ways when increasing N , but
retaining κ, ε and ν.
4.1 Theory for the class separated state
In the shopping trouble model agents have functionally identical payoff functions, which implies
that a priori distinctions between agents are not present. Where an agent ends up, in the lower
or in the upper class, depends as a consequence solely on the respective initial conditions. For
our analysis of the class separated state we denote with qU and q¬U qualities within the support
of the lower class that are taken/not taken by upper class agents. ML/MU are respectively the
number of lower/upper class agents. We assume that upper class agents are forced to cooperate
fully, playing distinct options. Numerically this holds in most cases.
Central to our consideration are the properties of evolutionary stable strategies [38], in
particular that the payoff is constant within the support. For the mixed strategy of the lower
class, pL(qi), this implies that the payoff function E(qi) is identical to the reward RL,
RL = v(q¬U)− κ [ML − 1] pL(q¬U) + ε pL(q¬U) log(RL/R¯) . (4.2)
Playing against an evolutionary stable strategy entails to receive the same constant payoff [38].
Outside the support of their own pure strategies, upper class agents play against the lower class
and against other upper class agents. For qi for which pL(qi)> 0 and and for which all upper class
policies vanish, pU(qi) = 0, the consequence is that E(qi) =RL also for upper class agents,
RL = v(q¬U)− κML pL(q¬U) .
Numerically small deviations from (4.3) can occur. The reason is that (4.3) enters the evolution
equation (2.3) multiplied by pU (q¬U), which vanishes in the final state. The condition, that
playing against an evolutionary stable strategy must yield the payoff of the strategy in question,
can be enforced consequently only while pU (q¬U) is still finite. This is the case only during a
transition period, while iterating towards stationarity.
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Equating (4.2) and (4.3) and dividing by pL(q¬U), which is positive within the support of the
lower class, yields the universal relation
log
(
RL
R¯
)
=−κ
ε
, RL = R¯ e
−κ/ε , (4.3)
which we verified numerically. Note that (4.3) is independent of the underlying utility function
v(qi), ofN and ofM . Denoting with fU =MU/M and fL =ML/M the relative fractions of upper
and lower class agents, one has
R¯= fURU + fLRL, RU =
R¯
fU
(
1− fLe−κ/ε
)
(4.4)
for RU, when using (4.3) for RL. For (4.4) we assumed that the rewards Rα for upper class agents
are all identical, which we will prove shortly. Together, one finds
RU −RL = R¯fU
(
1− e−κ/ε
)
(4.5)
for the gap in the rewards received by the upper and the lower class.
Eqs. (4.2) and (4.3) are conditions for the q¬U, that is for options not taken by upper class
agents. When playing an option qU occupied by an upper class agent, the lower class payoff
function reads
RL = v(qU)− κ
[
(ML − 1) pL(qU) + 1
]
+ ε pL(qU) log(RL/R¯)
= v(qU)− κML pL(qU)− κ , (4.6)
when using (4.3) and the precondition that there is exactly one upper class agent with pU(qU) = 1.
Note that payoff and reward coincide for lower class agents. We now turn to the payoff of upper
class agents,
EαU = v(qU)− κML pL(qU) + ε log(RαU/R¯) . (4.7)
Here pU(qU) = 1 has been used. With (4.6) one obtains
EαU −RL = κ+ ε log(RαU/R¯), EαU→RU , (4.8)
which is manifestly independent of qU, and hence also of the bare utility function v(qi). The
independency of (4.8) with respect to the utility function implies that the payoffs of all upper
class agents coincide, namely that EαU ≡RU. Equating (4.5) with (4.8) yields
RU −RL = R¯fU
(
1− e−κ/ε
)
= κ+ ε log
(
RU
R¯
)
, (4.9)
and hence
R¯
fU
(
1− e−κ/ε
)
= κ+ ε log
(
1− fLe−κ/ε
fU
)
= ε log
(
eκ/ε − fL
fU
)
, (4.10)
when using (4.4) to eliminate RU/R¯ on the right-hand-side of (4.9). With
R¯= ε
1− fL
1− e−κ/ε log
(
eκ/ε − fL
1− fL
)
(4.11)
we obtain a universal relation for the mean reward R¯. It follows, as the argument of the logarithm
is larger than unity, that R¯ is strictly positive. The mean reward depends only implicitly on the
utility function v(qi), through the fraction fL of lower class agents, but not explicitly. Together
with (4.8) and (4.5) the lower- and upper class rewards RL and RU are determined as (3.1) and
(3.2).
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4.2 Identical strategies
For the case that all M agents play the identical strategy p(qi)≡ pα(qi), the expected payoff Ei ≡
Eαi is
Ei = v(qi)− κ(M − 1)p(qi) → Ec . (4.12)
With p(qi) being evolutionary stable, the payoff Ei is constant on the support, Ei ≡Ec. For
qualities outside the support, the payoff Ei will be lower [38]. The probability p(qi) to select
an option enters Ei explicitly, which implies that p(qi) is obtained by a direct inversion of (4.12).
One has therefore
p(qi) =
1
κ(M − 1)
[
v(qi)− Ec
]
. (4.13)
The maxima of the probability distribution p(qi) and of the utility function v(qi) coincide. The
final payoff Ec is a free parameter which is determined by the normalization condition
1 =
∑
i; p(qi)>0
p(qi), p(qi)→ pi(Ec) , (4.14)
where the sum runs over the support of the policy. For finiteN the normalization condition (4.14)
needs to be solved numerically via (2.3). Results are shown in Fig. 4.
4.3 Large numbers of options
The normalization condition (4.14) reduces to an integral for large numbers of qualities N . The
boundary of the support are determined by
v(q) =Ec q± = 1±
√
1− Ec , (4.15)
since v(q) = 1− (1− q)2. The normalization condition (4.14) takes then the form
κ(M − 1) =
∫√1−Ec
−√1−Ec
(
1− x2 − Ec
) dx
∆x
, (4.16)
when using x= 1− q and ∆x= 2/N . We obtain
2κ
M − 1
N
=
(
2− 2
3
)
(1− Ec)3/2 , (4.17)
which yields (3.3), or
1− Ec =
(
3κ
2
)2/3(
M − 1
N
)2/3
. (4.18)
The resulting mixed strategy p(qi), as given (4.13), is in excellent agreement with simulations
when only a few upper class agents are left, as illustrated in Fig. 4 for κ= 0.3 and ε= 2.
Migration occurs when Ec→ 0, that is when
1 =
3κ
2
M − 1
N
≈ 3κν
2
, ν =
M
N
, (4.19)
where the last approximation holds for large M and N . The carrying capacity of the society, the
maximal possible density ν of agents, scales hence inversely with the strength of the competition,
κ. It is independent on ε.
The fraction fU of upper class agents is small when envy is large. In this limit one can
approximate the lower class reward RL with Ec, as determined by (4.18). This approximation,
Ec ≈RL, leads to (3.4), when taking also (3.1) for RL into account.
4.4 Scaling for two agents
The result for identical strategies, Eq. (4.18), has a well defined large-N limit for a constant filling
fraction ν =M/N . It is also of interest to consider the case of finite numbers of agents, M , say
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M = 2. In the limit N→∞ the policy p(q) converges in this case towards a pure strategy, viz to a
delta-function. The scaling for the maximum pmax and the width ∆q are
pmax ∼ 1− Ec ∼
(
1
N
)2/3
, ∆q∼√1− Ec ∼
(
1
N
)1/3
, (4.20)
see (4.13) and (4.15). The width ∆q of the support shrinks only slowly when increasing the
number N of options, remaining substantial even for large numbers, such as N = 103. This is
a quite non-trivial result, as one may have expected that the effect of competition between agents
decreases faster, namely as 1/N . Note that the scaling of the area, pmax∆q∼ 1/N , is determined
by the density of options, which is N/2.
4.5 Terminology
For convenience we present here an overview of the terminology used, including for
completeness selected key game-theoretical definitions. It follows that the shopping trouble
model is a probabilistic competitive evolutionary game based on undifferentiated but
distinguishable agents.
Options/qualities. An option is a possible course of action, like going to a shop to buy something.
For a game with a large number of options, as considered here, it is convenient to associate a
numerical value to an option. One may either identify the option with its numerical value, as it
is usual, e.g., for the war of attrition, or distinguish them on a formal level, as done here. For an
option i we denote with the quality qi the associated numerical value.
Pure/mixed strategies. In simple games, like the Hawk and Dove competition, options and
strategies are often not distinguished. Selecting an option, to fight or not to fight, is then identical
to the strategy. On a general level, strategies define how and when a player selects one of the
possible options. A strategy is pure when the agent plays the identical option at all times, and
mixed otherwise.
Probabilistic game. For probabilistic games strategies are defined in terms of probabilities. This is
the case for the shopping trouble model, where pα(qi) defines the probability that agent α selects
at any time the quality qi associated with the option i.
Support. A probabilistic strategy assigns a probability pα(qi)≥ 0 to all possible options. One often
finds that the pα(qj) are finite only for a subset of options, the support of the strategy. The size of
the support is larger than one for mixed strategies, and exactly one for pure strategies.
Undifferentiated distinguishable agents. Agents are differentiated when every agent is
characterized by an individual set of parameters, and undifferentiated when the same set of
parameters applies to everybody. Strategies are specific to individual agents, in any case, when
they are distinguishable. Indistinguishable agents share in contrast strategies.
Payoff/reward. The payoff function is a real-valued function of the qualities/options. The aim is
to optimize the strategy such that the average payoff is maximized. For the average payoff the
term reward is used throughout this study.
Evolutionary game. Evolutionary games are played not just once, but over and over again.
After each turn, agents update their individual strategies according to the payoffs received when
selecting option i with the probability pα(qi).
Competitive/cooperative game. In cooperative games parties may coordinate their individual
strategies, e.g. in order to optimize collective payoffs. Contracts (like I select option A if you
go for B) are, on the other hand, not possible for competitive games. Also possible are coalition
formation or hedonic games focusing on the formation of subgroups.
Nash equilibrium. For competitive games an equilibrium in terms of the individual strategies
may be attained. In this state, the Nash equilibrium, rewards diminish when individual players
attempt to change their strategies. More than one Nash state can exist for identical parameter
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settings. Nash stable configurations of strategies correspond to locally stable fixpoints of the
replicator dynamics (2.3) for evolutionary games.
Collective effect. In complex systems theory, a collective effect is present when the interaction
of an extended number of constituent elements gives rise to a new type of state. An example
from psychology is the emergence of mass psychology from individual behaviors. In the
shopping trouble model the transition from forced cooperation to class stratification is a collective
phenomenon.
Forced cooperation. Agents may agree to select different options in cooperative games, for
example in order to optimize overall welfare. Players may, on the other hand, be forced to
avoid each other in competitive games, because of the penalties that would incur otherwise on
individual levels. To an outside observer the resulting state has the traits of cooperation, which is
in this case however autonomously enforced.
Envy. In the context of the present study, envy is defined in terms of the payoff function. For this,
the payoff a given agent α receives, when selecting a certain option i, depends expressively on the
rewards of the other agents. Envy adds a non-monetary contribution to the reward of the player,
which is positive/negative if the overall reward of the player is larger/lower than that of others.
5. Discussion and conclusion
The process of class separation occurring in the shopping trouble model has several characteristic
features. One is that upper- and lower class engage in qualitatively different strategies. There
are as many different pure strategies as there are upper class agents, one for each, but only
one mixed strategy for the entire lower class. Individualism is lost when becoming a member
of the masses, to put it colloquially. Alternatively one may view the common mixed strategy
played by the lower class as an atypical group-level trait, namely one that doesn’t come with an
improved Darwinian fitness [39]. For an understanding we note that envy enters the shopping
trouble model as εpα(qi) log(Rα/R¯), which implies that the current probability pα(qi) to select
a given quality tends to be suppressed when Rα < R¯. Envy has a self-reinforcing effect when
the individual reward Rα is in contrast not smaller, but larger than the population average. This
argument explains why agents with modest/high rewards play mixed/pure strategies.
Evolutionary stable strategies can have different rewards only when their supports are not
identical, which becomes increasingly difficult with the continuous increase in the number of
mixed strategies that is observed during forced collaboration with raising levels of envy, see Fig. 5.
Policies merge once the phase space for the support of distinct mixed strategies runs out and a
single mixed lower-class strategy remains. Class stratification corresponds from this perspective
to a strategy merging transition, producing in consequence an atypical group-level trait.
A second feature characterizing class stratification is universality, namely that the underlying
utility function v(qi) affects the Nash equilibrium exclusively through the fraction fL of lower-
class agents. An interesting corollary is that is does not really matter which options the upper
class selects, as the reward, and consequently also the monetary income, remains unaffected. One
could call this freedom the luxury of choice of being rich. Upper class strategies tend to cluster
nevertheless around the maximum of the underlying utility function, compare Fig. 3, which is
however a purely dynamic effect. Policies that prefer qualities with large v(qi) have increased
growth rates while iterating towards stationarity.
Beyond its original interpretation as a competitive shopping model, one can view the shopping
trouble model as a basic model for competition for scarce goods, in particular in a social context.
The qualities qi would correspond in this setting either to distinct social positions or to job
opportunities, with the bare utility v(qi) encoding respectively social status and salaries. It is
presently unclear to which extent, and if at all, human societies can be described in a first
approximation by the shopping trouble model. In case, western societies are presumable in
the phase denoted here forced collaboration, with varying distances to the class stratification
transition. A transition to the stratified phase would be equivalent to a major socio-cultural
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paradigm shift [40], such as the possible incipient dynamic instability of modern democracies due
to growing mismatch between the build-in time delays, the election cycle, and the accelerating
pace of political opinion dynamics [41]. This is a somewhat worrisome outlook, given that the
repercussions of envy are amplified, as shown in Fig. 6, when societies become more and more
competitive. A possible ongoing development [42].
The stratified phase found in the shopping trouble model is the result of a self-organizing
process, with the consequence that it has universal properties that can be controlled only
indirectly by external influences. Policy makers loose part of their tools when a society class
separates. Class stratified societies are in this sense intrinsically resistant to external influences.
Overall our results show that envy tends to cement class differences, instead of softening them. It
may be tempting for people at the bottom to compare what they have with the riches of the top,
but it is actually counterproductive.
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